Document Type : Research Paper

Authors

1 Associate Professor Department of Sport Management, Faculty of Sport Sciences, Alzahra University, Tehran, Iran

2 Ph.D. Management. Department of Management, Tarbiat Modarres University. Tehran. Iran

3 M.S. Department of Sport Management, Faculty of Sport Sciences, Alzahra University, Tehran, Iran

Abstract

The purpose of this study is to provide an economic model for assigning the privilege of exploiting sports complexes, based on game theory. The present research was conducted by the descriptive-survey method and by conducting interviews with the officials and the operator of the Enghelab sports complex. Also, we completed our information by reviewing the tender documents and contracts. Based on the findings, the variables influencing the development and conclusion of contracts for the transfer of this unit identified, and the proposed approaches were selected. Among them, the most appropriate and efficient strategy for the owner and operator introduced. In the next step, based on the best result, the proposed game was designed and modelled. The results showed that when independent private information dominates the auction space, the strategy of changing the auction mechanism is more appropriate for both parties, and the pricing strategy is the best strategy, which is also Nash's balance in this game.

Keywords

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